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Department of Banking. Mr. Jaworski
often teams with Reed Smith litigators
to defend lenders and servicers in
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described in this article. Under the
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courses designed specifically to help
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Mr. Jaworski wishes to extend special
thanks to his colleague, Len Bernstein,
for his helpful insights.
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Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage' and the 2
decision in Taylor v. FlagstarBank, FSB, 2
the controversy over payment of yield
spread premiums might have been
thought to have finally ended.
Unfortunately, the U.S. District Court
for the District of New Hampshire
recently handed down a decision that
may provide class actions with more
ammunition to continue to pursue
these cases.3 This article will discuss
yield spread premiums, recent court
decision concerning this issue and how
a
such decisions have let
uncertainty as to how the courts and
even Congress will address the issue in
the future.
Yield Spread Premiums
Yield spread premiums, ("YSPs")

I

are compensations received by a
mortgage broker from a mortgage
lender for originating a loan at an
interest rate ("point") above the
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benchmark rate, i.e. the rate at which
the lender would otherwise agree to
make the loan. Over the past year and
a half, consumers have bombarded
courts around the country with class
action suits alleging that YSPs violate
the United States Real Estate

4
Settlement Procedures Act, ("RESPA").

Under RESPA, it is illegal for a
mortgage broker to accept a fee merely
for referring business to a mortgage
lender when the transaction involves a
federally regulated mortgage loan.5
RESPA, however, excludes from
this prohibition any payment of
compensation for goods or facilities
actually furnished or work actually
performed.6 The common question in
yield spread premium cases is often
whether a fee given by a mortgage
broker to a mortgage lender is in fact
compensation for goods or facilities
furnished or work performed. From
the industry perspective, YSPs
represent part of the broker's
compensation for the services he or she
provides to the customer. Lenders
argue that yield spread premiums
operate merely as a pricing mechanism
to enable consumers who cannot, or do
not wish to, pay their broker's fee "up
front" (at the dosing) to finance the
cost of the broker's services over the
life of the loan through a slightly
higher interest rate. The plaintiffs
allege that YSPs are illegal referral fees
in violation of Section 8 of RESPA.
The primary battleground on which
this recent waive of YSP class action
cases has been fought is on the issue of
dass certification. Under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(a), to have a class
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certified, plaintiffs must show that (1)
the class is so numerous that joining all
members is not practical, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to all
members of the class, (3) the claims of
the class representatives are typical of
the daims or defenses of the other
members of the class, and (4) the class
representatives will fairly and
adequately protect the interest of the
other class members.7 More than one
hundred and fifty class action
complaints have been filed over the
last several years by persons
challenging the legality of yield spread
premiums. To date only two cases
have reached a determination on the
merits, both in favor of the lender.8
Georgia Court Denies Motion to
Consolidate Claims
In July 1998, the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
denied plaintiffs' motion to consolidate
nineteen separate YSP cases for
purposes of discovery and trial in
Jackson v. Ford Consumer Finance
Company, Inc.9 In that case, separate
lawsuits were brought against various
lenders alleging that the lenders made
payments to mortgage loan brokers in
violation of RESPA. Consolidation
motions are essentially an appeal to the
court's discretion. The court must
determine whether the risk of
prejudice and potential confusion
posed by juggling multiple cases that
are similar yet not identical outweighs
the risk of separate courts hearing the
cases and reaching inconsistent
decisions of law or fact. The court
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must also weigh the burden placed on
the parties involved, the availability of
resources and witnesses, the time
needed to try the cases, and the
expenses involved litigating separate
cases. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
42(b) states, "consolidation of lawsuits
may be granted when all of the cases
involved have common questions of
law and fact and where the court
believes that consolidation will help to
expedite the trial and eliminate
unnecessary repetition and
confusion." 10
In rejecting the motion, the court
applied the Eleventh Circuit's standard
in Culpepperv. Inland Mortgage." The
court observed that liability for the
loan transactions at issue was
dependent on the facts of the

earlier issued the Taylor decision,
rejected the plaintiffs' motion to
consolidate for the same reasons
expressed in Taylor.' Quoting from
Taylor, the court observed that, "[tihe
mere fact that the borrower paid some
compensation [to the broker in tablefunded transaction] does not
automatically mean that the YSP in not
compensation" properly paid for the
broker's services. 6 In the court's view,
a lender may always defend itself, in
some or all of the challenged
transactions, on the basis that the YSPs
"are additional payments for the
services rendered for which the
borrower also paid a brokerage fee." 7
The court refused to accept, as the
plaintiffs urged, that the compensation
paid by the borrower directly to the
broker was intended as full
individual transactions.' 2 The court
compensation for the broker's
also indicated that the plaintiffs failed
to show that the transactions at issue or services. 8 Significantly, the court
the lenders' practices were so similar
explained that although defendants
submitted an affidavit by the mortgage
that economics could be achieved
3
broker stating that it would have
through consolidation.' The court
charged the borrower more for its
reasoned that confusion and
duplication of effort would result from services if it would not have received
the YSP from the lender, such a
the participation of eighteen different
showing was not necessary to defeat
lenders in discovery and pretrial
class certification; thus, denial of class
matters regarding transactions in
certification could rest merely on the
which only one or two of the lenders
might have had any involvement. 4 To "possibility that a yield spread
premium may have been intended as
avoid confusion, the court denied the
additional compensation." 9
motion to consolidate and each
Similarly, in August 1998, the U.S.
individual YSP case was returned to its
District Court in Minnesota rejected a
original court.
class certification motion in another
YSP case, Schmitz v. Aegis Mortgage
Denial of class Certification in Two
Corporation.20 In doing so, the court
Circuits
illustrated the importance of the
In Chandlerand Wayne v. Washtenaw Eleventh Circuit's decision on a

Mortgage Company, the court, who had
1999
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rehearing in Culpepper, noting that:
[a]lthough the Culpepperv. Inland

Mortgage decision may lend
support for the merits of plaintiff's
claim, the posture of the Culpepper
v. InlandMortgage case involved the

grant and subsequent reversal of
summary judgment. The Eleventh
Circuit clarified that, on remand,
the defendant would be permitted
to introduce evidence of services
provided by the mortgage broker to
the mortgage lender.... In addition,
the Culpepper v. Inland Mortgage

decision did not address class
certification.'
The court then ruled that the
plaintiff failed to satisfy the
predominance requirement of Federal
Court Rule 23(b)(3) (that common
questions of law or fact predominate
over any questions involving only
individual members) 22 The court
further agreed with the court's analysis
in Taylor v. Flagstarthat the trier of fact

will be called upon to determine
whether the yield spread premium
was intended to be additional
payment for the broker's services to
the lender and borrower and then,
if so, whether there is any excess
payment over the
reasonable ...market value of the
services provided.23
A New Hampshire District Court
Goes Its Own Way
In August 1998, the U.S. District
Court in New Hampshire decided
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Mulligan v. Choice Mortgage Corp.,
USA.24 In Mulligan, the plaintiffs

decided to refinance their homes in
1996 and signed an agreement with
Choice Mortgage to assist them in
finding a suitable lender.25 The
agreement provided that Choice would
provide the plaintiffs with the best
possible loan program for their needs.26
In return for this service, the plaintiff
agreed to pay Choice Mortgage a 3%
brokerage fee and reimbursement of
administrative expenses.27 Choice
Mortgage was able to find a loan for
the named plaintiff in the amount of
$124,000 from a mortgage lender. 28 As
a result, at their refinancing dosing, the
named plaintiff paid Choice Mortgage
$3,720 as a brokerage fee and more
than $800 to cover administrative
expenses.29
The plaintiffs alleged that, at the
dosing, Choice Mortgage also received
a payment of $3,720 from the
approving lender as a referral fee for
securing from the plaintiffs an
agreement to enter into a mortgage
loan at an interest rate higher than that
at which the lender would otherwise
have agreed to make the loan. ° This
fee, the plaintiffs alleged, was in
violation of RESPA.3' In addition, the
plaintiff alleged that their claims were
part of a pattern of misconduct
whereby Choice Mortgage similarly
took advantage of other individuals in
different loan applications.3 2
The plaintiffs brought a class action
complaint against Choice Mortgage
alleging violations of RESPA, the
Racketeering Influence and Corrupt
Organizations Act, ("RICO"), and the
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New Hampshire Consumer Protection
Act. 3 In addition, the plaintiff alleged
that Choice Mortgage breached the
fiduciary duty it owed to class
members based on the contracts it held
with them, and committed common
law fraud. 34 As a result, the plaintiffs
moved to certify a class of one
hundred-thirteen individuals who
entered into mortgage transactions
where Choice Mortgage acted as the
mortgage broker and received
payments from the borrower and the
lender.
Taking its cue from the unbroken
line of YSP cases in which class
certification has been denied, Choice
argued that if class certification were
granted individual issues would
predominate over any common
questions.3 6 In addition, the trier of
fact would be unable to determine
whether any of the YSP payments
made to Choice constituted payment
"for goods or facilities furnished or for
services actually performed" without
first undertaking a case-by-case
analysis as to whether the payment
bore a "reasonable relationship" to the
market value of any services Choice
provided to the lender or the
borrower.37
The court, however, took a different
view. The court appeared to accept
plaintiffs' bold assertions that (1)
because plaintiffs' paid Choice a
brokerage fee for its services, the
lender's payment to Choice could not
have constituted compensation for
services to the borrower, and (2)
because the amount of the payment
varied exclusively according to the

1999

difference between the lenders' "par"
rate and the rate at which the loan
dosed, the lender's payment to Choice
could not have been compensation for
services performed for the lender.38
A key factor in court's decision was
that Choice Mortgage apparently
"failed to offer any evidence or
arguments to counter these
assertions."39 However, the court in
Chandlerv. Washtenaw Mortgage Co.

stated that such an offer is not
necessary to defeat class certification. 4°
Additionally, it is enough that it is
possible for the yield spread premium
to have been intended as additional
payment for the broker's services to
the lender and borrower; such a
possibility renders it likely that a
determination of RESPA liability would
require a fact-intensive inquiry into
each and every loan transaction.41
Furthermore, the decision in
Mulligan acknowledged that YSP's are
not per se illegal, yet "it does not
necessarily follow that a RESPA claim
can never be suitable for certification as
a class action." 42 Moreover, in this case,
"the evidence demonstrates that
plaintiffs' RESPA claims will succeed or
fail predominantly because of issues
common to the class as a whole." 43
However, only if there is no possibility
that the YSP payment in connection
with any loan could have represented
additional compensation for services
provided by the broker to the borrower
or the lender. If that possibility exists,
then a case-by-case factual analysis
would seem to be necessary to ferret
out each transaction in which such
possibility exists and then to determine
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what services the broker provided and
whether the total compensation
received by the broker from the lender
and the borrower was reasonable.
Several facts may help to explain
the result in Mulligan. First, Choice
Mortgage's brokerage agreement with
its customers specified that Choice
Mortgage would "endeavor to provide
[the borrowers] the best possible loan
for [their] specific needs." 44 While this
should not have been a dispositive
factor (since it is entirely possible that
Choice Mortgage could show that the
loan a particular borrower received
was the best possible loan for his or her
situation), it certainly seems to have
cast Choice Mortgage, perhaps
undeservedly, in a somewhat harsh
light. As stated by the court, "[iut
seems highly unlikely that any member
of the putative class had a 'specific
need' to borrow money at an interest
rate higher than that at which the
lender was otherwise willing to
charge." 4s However, the fact is that it
may well have been better for the
borrower to pay the higher rate if that
meant that they would not have to pay
more up front to the broker.
Second, the case is a relatively small
one, with only 113 class members,
involving 72 loan transactions,
geographically concentrated in just two
states, New Hampshire and
Massachusetts, and brokered by only
one mortgage broker.46 In light of these
numbers, the court may well have
considered the possibility that the case
was manageable even if the court ends
up having to examine the facts of some
or all of the individual transactions. In

96. Loyola Consumer Law Review

this regard, the court may not have
fully appreciated the extent to which
individual loan transactions may vary
in terms of borrower characteristics,
lender requirements, loan program
parameters and qualifications, and the
work involved in putting together a
loan package that will be accepted by
the lender.
Third, it appears that Choice did
not assert that if it had not received a
yield spread premium, it would have
charged the borrower more. Although
as indicated earlier, the Taylor court
found dispositive the mere possibility
that a YSP was intended as additional
compensation to the broker for its
services to the borrower, the fact that
such an assertion was made in that
case probably helped to crystallize the
lender's argument and give it
substance. The decision in Mulligan
does not even admit of this possibility.
Finally, there is the fact that no
lender was sued in Mulligan, only the
broker, Choice Mortgage. We can only
speculate whether that fact alone
would be sufficient to distinguish
Mulligan from future YSP class
certification decisions in cases in which
lenders are also involved as
defendants. However, it seems beyond
dispute that the introduction of a
lender, or multiple lenders, into a YSP
dass action case would certainly
complicate matters. For example, it
might require that the court examine
not only the broker's contract and
conduct, but also any and all relevant
provisions in the correspondent loan
agreements between the broker and the
lender(s), the content and timing of
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disclosures provided by the lender(s),
the lender(s)' pricing policies, etc.
These complications, had they been
present in Mulligan, may well have
tipped the scales in favor of denying
class certification.

ENDNOTES

Conclusion

3

The significance of the Mulligan
decision is still in question. Lenders
obviously hope that Mulligan will
prove to be an aberration - a dark blip
on an otherwise bright radar screen.
The next couple YSP decisions should
provide a good indication whether this
hope will become a reality.
In addition, Mulligan may also
renew Congressional interest in
enacting the YSP class action
moratorium bills that are currently
pending in both the House and Senate.
In April 1997, Representative Robert
Ehrlich of Maryland introduced HR
1283, the Real Estate Settlement
Procedures Class Action Relief Act of
1997, ("Moratorium Bill"). The bill was
drafted as a result of the growing
number of YSP class action lawsuits.
By December 1997, the bill has the
support of ninety-two other sponsors.
If enacted, the Moratorium Bill would
put an end to any pending yield spread
premium class actions. Representative
Ehrlich, who introduced HR 1283 in
the House, is already on record as
saying that, in light of the outcome of
Mulligan v. Choice Mortgage, his
legislation is needed more urgently
than ever. In any event, it is possible
that the coming months will constitute
a defining moment in the evolution of
the yield spread premium debate.
1999
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